Understanding Sheikh Hasina’s Downfall and Success of the Mass Uprising in Bangladesh

by Khandakar Tahmid Rejwan

The political downfall of Sheikh Hasina has turned significant international attention towards the second-largest economy in South Asia. Arguably, her demise and that of her party, the Awami League (AL) mark the most critical change in the political history of independent Bangladesh, which will have profound national and international consequences for the country. This article highlights the history of Hasina’s rise in Bangladeshi politics and her subsequent consolidation of political power after her 2009 election victory through internal grip and international alignment. Then, it looks into the Monsoon Revolution, the mass uprising that resulted in Hasina’s downfall , and why it is a warning to other authoritarians worldwide. Finally, it explores the contemporary political dynamics surrounding three significant forces in Bangladesh: the interim government, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), and Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh (JIB). This analysis tries to portray a brief but clear understanding of the internal political dynamics of Bangladesh in the context of Sheikh Hasina’s steady rise and subsequent decline.

Looking back at Sheikh Hasina’s accession in Bangladeshi politics 

Sheikh Hasina had been the longest-serving prime minister in Bangladesh's history and the world. She had been elected into the office for a total of five terms (From 1996-2001 and again from 2009 to 2024), with the latest 2024 electoral victory in the national parliamentary poll being her fourth consecutive term as the premier. Her father, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, was one of the pioneers of independent Bangladesh and is regarded as the Father of the Nation. After Mujib and his family’s assassination in 1975 by a faction of young and mid-ranking army officers, the country experienced 15 years of military dictatorship, first under General Ziaur Rahman and then under General Hussain Muhammad Ershad. Hasina and her sister, Sheikh Rehana, were the only survivors of the Bangabandhu family after the 1975 assassinations, as they were based in West Germany while the events unfolded. 

Hasina later took asylum in India and, after six years, returned to Bangladesh. Just before her repatriation, she was elected President of her father’s political party, the Awami League (AL). She started to organize activities against the military rule of Ershad, allying with AL’s arch nemesis, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) led by Khaleda Zia, the wife of General Ziaur Rahman, who had by then also been assassinated. Later, Ershad succumbed to the demands of the political parties to end his military regime, and a national election was held in 1991. Hasina’s AL won 88 out of 300 electoral seats, the second highest compared to BNP’s 140 seats. Eventually, Hasina became the principal opposition party leader of the Jatiya Shangshad – the National Parliament of Bangladesh – which kickstarted her formal career as a lawmaker. Her party eventually secured a win in the national parliamentary election of 1996, meaning that, after a 21-year forced leave, the AL was back in power. 

One of the interesting features of Bangladeshi politics is the changing nature of popular support after each regime finishes its terms. The same thing happened to Hasina’s AL when they lost power to the BNP in the 2001 national polls. Eventually, Khaleda Zia’s party ended its mandate in 2006 and engaged in a political crisis against the AL, creating country-wide instability and resulting in several casualties. President Iyajuddin Ahmed’s mandate was replaced by a military-backed caretaker government (CTG) headed by Chief Advisor Fakhruddin Ahmed on January 7, 2007. The military subsequently took control of the country in the guise of the interim government’s request to stop the political turmoil. It stated the need to prevent country-wide unrest and anarchy due to political divisions. Hasina and Khaleda, alongside other key political figures, were confined or jailed, and the military implemented harsh measures to restore stability. After nearly two years, the CTG announced that a national parliamentary election would take place at the end of 2008, and political leaders, including Hasina and Khaleda, were released ahead of the polls. The AL won a landslide victory with 230 seats, and Sheikh Hasina was back in power.

Hasina’s forceful internal grip and strategic international alignment 

After formally taking power in 2009, Hasina started to exert control over major institutions in the country. Her party loyalists were appointed in crucial bureaucratic, administrative, and judicial positions. She also carefully took control of the country's critical security apparatus, including the influential intelligence agencies and the powerful military. Through recruiting, appointing, and designating personnel favored by her, Hasina instituted partisanship in state institutions, and she started to instrumentalize them for her political purposes. For example, her loyalists in the judiciary amended the constitution to curtail judicial checks and balances to abuse and misuse government power and position. It also established a way to abolish the procedure of holding elections through the Care Taker Government (CTG) which ensured free and fair voting. As a result, widespread voter fraud by the AL was reported in 2018, and the most recent results were in the 2024 elections. Again, police and law enforcement agencies were used to crush major opposition parties like the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh (JIB) through raids, arbitrary arrests, and the use of unlawful force. Elite Counter-Terrorism (CT) units like Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) were used to conduct enforced disappearances of people, some of whom were found dead in the aftermath. The Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI), the combined military intelligence organ of the Armed Forces, was used for the abduction and illegal imprisonment of political opponents in their infamous detention facilities known as ‘Aynaghors’ (The House of Mirrors). The country’s topmost Signals and Technical Intelligence (SIGINT and TECHINT) agency, the National Telecommunications and Monitoring Cell (NTMC), was employed to intercept cellphone and online communications of critics and political opponents, who were blackmailed into making concessions.

International human rights groups recorded terrible infringements of democratic values, freedom of speech, civil rights, and media freedom. The draconian Digital Security Act (DSA), which was later renamed the Cyber Security Act (CSA), which gave the government the right to imprison without bail, arrest without warrant, and severely interrogate, was enacted to further silence any dissident or critical views. More than performing administrative roles, bureaucrats were turned into the AL’s administrative propaganda wing, which imposed harsh civil penalties on any dissident. By all these means, Hasina achieved superior control and grip over the top tiers of the country’s governing pillars, which served her interests more than those of the country and its ordinary people. Via flashy infrastructure, mega projects, and digitalization, her administration is accused of corrupting almost all the sectors of the country. The business-political-bureaucratic elites embezzled, laundered, and stole public funds and banks. Inflation and public debt recorded historic highs. 

While making the country capitulate to her party, Hasina also maintained widespread support from India, China, and Russia by deepening strategic ties with them. The relationship between Dhaka and New Delhi became historically warm as the former agreed to provide strategically important land transit, transshipment, and rail connectivity to the latter for alternative access into India’s North Eastern Region (NER). In 2022, both also signed a comprehensive defense agreement whereby India provided Bangladesh with a defense line of credit (LOC) to buy its manufactured arms and equipment. The AL regime also turned a blind eye to India’s border killings. Similarly, Beijing is Dhaka's largest trading partner. More than 1000 Chinese companies are based in Dhaka, employing 550,000 people. China also assisted in constructing the Padma Bridge, which helped Hasina’s subtle vision to elude people on her role in the country’s development—just a month before Hasina’s demise, Beijing and Dhaka elevated their strategic partnership to new heights. China is also the largest arms exporter to Dhaka and was the first state to sign a defense cooperation deal with Bangladesh in 2002. Lastly, Moscow was awarded with a contract to build Dhaka’s first-ever nuclear power plant in 2015. The Rooppur Nuclear Power Plant (RNPP) is the most expensive megaproject in Bangladesh's history. These ties underscore the support for the Hasina regime by the three countries. While public sentiment on Hasina’s tilt towards India was highly unpopular due to the question of Bangladesh’s sovereignty, the latter mostly shielded her regime from any US criticism of her government’s malpractice. Her close ties with Putin and Xi, two of the world's most potent authoritarians, was also a way for her to counter Western criticism of her disregard for democratic values and human rights principles.

The Road to Hasina’s Downfall 

After winning the 2024 parliamentary elections, Hasina was regarded as irreplaceable and unbeatable. No one thought that the primary political opponents would cause her downfall in power, let alone the general students and ordinary people. It was mainly a student-led protest against reinstating first- and second-class government job quotas for the 1971 Freedom Fighters (FF) family members. The protests started in the first week of July after an upper court canceled a 2018 government decision to remove quotas for these public jobs. The initial rally was primarily organized by students from the University of Dhaka (DU), Bangladesh’s highest-ranking university, which had a legacy of organizing political and social movements since its foundation. This movement quickly spread from the to other universities countrywide. It took the form of the ‘Anti-Discriminatory Student Movement’ which called for reforming the inequality of allocated FF quotas. Hasina responded to these steps as if they were part of a conspiracy of opposition parties to instigate instability and labeled the students as ‘sons of Rajakars’ (collaborators and anti- independence forces). This event was significant: it motivated the students to increase their efforts as they were directly insulted for pursuing their legitimate rights. In one of the largest student protests held at DU, on July 15, 2024,, the AL’s infamous student armed wing, the Chhatra League, indiscriminately assaulted the students.

The next day, protests spread rapidly in all of the country’s universities, and clashes occurred between the police and students. One of the latter, Abu Sayeed, was shot dead, and four others were killed in other areas. This prompted people from all classes of society to participate in the movement. When things got worse, the government imposed 11 days of internet blackout and deployed the military as a part of the curfew imposed on July 19, 2024. According to the database of the Bangladesh Peace Observatory, an open-source platform that records all kinds of violence inside Bangladesh, from the 18th to the 24th of July, at least 300 hundred people were shot dead by law enforcement agencies, and about 10,000 people were arrested that month alone through fearful measures like block raids. Leading Student coordinators like Nahid Islam and Asif Mahmud were detained and tortured by the Detective Branch (DB) in an attempt to have them withdraw their 9-point demand list. Despite these measures, public participation in the movement intensified and increased. Under pressure, Hasina withdrew the curfew, restored the internet, and removed job quotas by the end of July. Such actions didn’t curb the widespread resentment against her, which kept growing. People were not fearful this time nor willing to spare her any chance. Moreover, the army declared that they would not use any force against the civilians, which encouraged more civil participation as there was no more fear of a military crackdown. The student movement turned into a public student uprising, which finally became a mass uprising. The 9-point demand list turned into a single demand: Hasina’s resignation. The student coordinators therefore announced a long march to be held on August 5, 2024. At least a million people from outside Dhaka poured into the capital and joined the existing crowd demanding Hasina’s overthrow. Under pressure, Hasina reluctantly fled the country to her close ally, India. People from all spheres of society celebrated, and this ‘Monsoon Revolution’ became known as Bangladesh’s ‘Second Liberation. ’ It cost the nation at least 700 innocent lives and thousands of people being injured, many of them permanently maimed or having lost their vision. The month-long carnage and repression also had a severe psychological effect on Bangladeshis all over the world.

A lesson for authoritarians? 

There are two ways to streamline the causes of the mass uprising’s success in Bangladesh. First, people had been increasingly frustrated and resentful of the corruption, malpractice, and incompetence of Hasina’s regime during a decade and a half. Second, Hasina and her party’s policy of openly committing massacres against innocent civilians, including women and children who were shot brutally, broke the barrier of mass patience on her regime. Hasina and the AL thought that they were invincible and above any accountability. Moreover, she was reluctant to negotiate with the students and consider the people’s demands. The level of persecution by government forces rendered worthless any later apology or opening to negotiation. Using live ammunition, firing from helicopters, and using lethal force against unarmed civilians, the regime of Hasina simply echoed what scholar Ruth Blakely terms ‘State Terrorism. ’ She never thought that her end in power would be propagated by young students who probably instigated the first successful Gen-Z revolution in the world through a combination of on-the-ground protests and social media activism. Significantly enough, Hasina’s demise is a testament to popular emancipation and a lesson for other authoritarians around the globe that they may face a similar fate sooner or later.

The contemporary political landscape in Bangladesh 2.0 

Dr Muhammad Yunus, a Nobel Peace Prize laureate and famous micro-credit financier, was nominated by the Anti-Discriminatory Students Movement coordinators to lead the new interim government and ‘Bangladesh 2.0’ amidst the chaos and anarchy that characterized the post-Hasina power vacuum. His interim government took oath on August 9, 2024, and is composed of 21 members from diverse backgrounds. It is vested with people’s trust to reform and rebuild Bangladesh to honor the sacrifices made by the Monsoon Revolution martyrs.

The interim government has not yet mapped out the precise timeline for holding a national parliamentary election, and it may not happen very soon. Significant reforms are needed in the State's governance, constitution, security, administration, and education sectors. Five out of six reform commissions have already been formed, and specific timetables given for them to submit their findings and recommendations. Chief of Army Staff General Waker-uz-Zaman, who was handed the power after Hasina fled and before Yunus took office, indicated that the Army is ready to help the government announce an election in the next 18 months. Despite the initial urge by other significant political parties like the BNP and JIB to hold elections as soon as possible, that spirit has entirely faded given the reform necessary to hold free and fair polls. Therefore, Yunus’s interim administration will have at least half to one and a half year to call for a new election and rebuild the state apparatus from top to bottom. 

Under such circumstances, major political parties like the BNP and JIB have ramped up their efforts to win the hearts and minds of the people. The BNP has started to discipline its activists at the grassroots level. It has already officially punished, expelled, and warned several members who had broken the code of conduct. Meanwhile, it has also conducted community service campaigns like distributing relief funds to flood-affected people. As for JIB, which had previously been criticized for its anti-liberation stance during Bangladesh's war of independence from Pakistan in 1971 and for imposing solid Islamic rhetoric, it is now focused on convincing people of its past mistakes promoting religious coexistence. It has pledged to guard the Hindu temples in this year’s Durga Puja festival and has worked extensively to provide relief and community services to flood-affected areas.

Interestingly, both parties are historic allies, but a rift in this relationship is now apparent, especially as one of the BNP’s top leaders, Mirza Fakhrul, affirms that both parties have their respective agenda and separate priorities at present. Given the absence and isolation of the AL from any significant political arrangements in the coming years, it is clear that the BNP and JIB will be decisive in the next election. JIB is also trying to boost its constituency by bringing all the Islamist parties under its umbrella or coalition. Interestingly, both the BNP and JIB affirmed that the AL must be taken to justice but not eliminated or eradicated as a political entity. This contradicts the common public perception of their rivalry and animosity and indicates a sense of political understanding and tolerance among themselves. Both the BNP and JIB also share a common fear that a political front will be opened by the key student coordinators who led the Monsoon Revolution. The public perception of a third-party alternative to the established ones is positive, given the disappointing experience with major parties. The near future will say whether or not this idea materializes. 

The end of the AL’s and Hasina’s 15 years of rule marks perhaps the most important political development in the history of independent Bangladesh. The new interim government must ensure that it resonates with the prevalent spirit of the uprising, which includes freedom of speech and assurance of fundamental rights. Moreover, other major political parties must also take notes on the mistakes made by the previous administration. Bangladesh is now navigating a political landscape where, amidst uncertainty, everyone is trying to convince their fellow citizens of their optimism towards working together and rebuilding confidence in the country’s governance system. The interim government and the political parties should learn from Sheikh Hasina’s miscalculations and misinterpretations of the public’s will. Already, the Yunus-led administration is doing its best to stabilize the internal dynamics of the State and hold regular dialogue sessions with political party leaders and civil society members. For Yunus, the primary domestic challenge is to reset and rebuild the State’s institutions, governance, democratic values, and fundamental human rights. For whoever is elected in the future, the primary challenge will be the continuation and further improvement of the changes made.