How to secure Europe, before the establishment of the European Army?
- Oliver Suchy
- Jun 19
- 6 min read
by Oliver Suchý
The idea of the European Army is appealing. In the Stockholm Journal of International Affairs, as well as other international affairs, defence, and international security journals, the topic has been largely discussed. However, the negotiations can take several years or decades to establish institutional bodies, proceedings with member states, and set command infrastructure, which is essential for deploying complex military operations. But what in the meantime?
Indeed, in times of polycrisis, the pressure for Europe to be able to defend itself increases, and demand for a European Army is increasing. What can Europe do to increase its security without the European Army? More frequently, we face pessimism towards NATO’s future and cooperation after Trump took office. This security analysis will aim to serve as a light of rationality. It provides a perspective on European security, where it does not oppose the idea of the European Army but rather suggests security possibilities for Europe without it.
The declarations of President Trump and his administration might imply pessimism and rational fear, however, neither Trump nor any of the governmental officials suggested the US has any incentive to leave NATO. They have, however, declared that in case of an attack on NATO, the US will not protect member states that do not invest at least 2% of GDP on defence, undermining the credibility of the US commitment towards Article 5 of the Treaty: “No, I would not protect you. In fact, I would encourage [Russia] to do whatever the hell they want. You gotta pay. You gotta pay your bills”[1]. Importantly, this is not a formal position of the US, but merely a threat or warning. In case of such an occasion, would the US undermine the trust among NATO partners even if it is not in the national interest of the US to do so? Additionally, Trump is a “transactional politician” – a businessman in essence - meaning that such non-intervention would endanger the security of foreign investments, for example. Despite that, there is an interdisciplinary consensus that Europe must increase its security.
Before suggesting the possibilities to enhance European security, we must get back to the core issue of why the idea of the European Army might be problematic. From a legal perspective, European law considers national security and defence (intelligence services, military and defence policies) as an exclusive power of member states. For this reason, in the Council of the European Union, the Common Foreign and Security Policy requires unanimity – to secure the national sovereignty principle. From a procedural perspective, it raises many questions: how to overcome institutional establishment obstacles, what would the chain of command look like, and fundamentally, would member states give up their military capacities and a part of their sovereignty? What if a state decides to leave the European Army, how would the structure transform back to the national level?
Eventually, maybe the European Army will be established due to the pressure of polycrises. But what could member states do to increase security without the European Army? In this article, based on previous policy proposals, analysis, and research, I conclude with three essential steps: firstly, fragmentation reduction of the defence industry; secondly, standardization and interoperability of the equipment; and finally, investing in research and development.
Promotion of economic cooperation in defence spending
Or the fragmentation reduction of the industry. 18% of defence equipment is procured jointly, the rest on a national level. Promoting and implementing joint procurement (while keeping Article 346 TFEU that allows Member States to bypass EU rules on procurement, if they believe it threatens national security), thereby gaining economies of scale, is crucial to unlock the potential of Europe’s defence industry, which remains too small, fragmented, and lacks innovation. At the same time, it reduces the costs of units, lowers the financial burden on individual countries, creates a space for more ambitious projects, and increases the incentives to invest in defence.
Furthermore, joint procurement integrates the European defence industry, which is essential to building the European Army, which would reduce dependency on external suppliers such as China and the U.S. Currently, for example, unmanned aerial systems (UAS) are imported from a small number of the same suppliers. Only one commercial drone producer (DJI) is estimated to be 70% of the global production.
Collaboration is, indeed, supported by initiatives like the European Defence Fund (EDF), but challenges like national interests and bureaucratic hurdles remain. Despite these challenges, deeper defence cooperation can guarantee a more robust and independent security framework while increasing Europe's military strength and competitiveness in the global arena. While having 5 out of the 15 largest global defence contractors in Europe, the European defence industry landscape is dominated by national players operating on relatively small domestic markets, lacking the scale for innovation and for winning big contracts.
Standardization of equipment and interoperability
Standardization of equipment in the military refers to a process of aligning military equipment, technology, and weaponry to ensure compatibility and efficiency (both production and at war). European military equipment is vastly fragmented, different member states have different independent defence industries. Standardization would reduce the costs of maintenance and production. Standardized weaponry, vehicles, ammunition, and communication systems reduce logistics challenges and simplify supply chains. Unifying market products strengthens the European defence industry, which subsequently increases competitiveness with other global actors.
Enhanced interoperability within the military allows different systems to cooperate on joint missions. By standardizing equipment and enhancing interoperability, European forces can respond more rapidly to threats, reduce wasteful duplication, and strengthen military cohesion. Existing initiatives like the European Defence Fund aim to promote these efforts, but overcoming national interests and industrial competition remains a challenge. For this reason, interoperability must be interconnected with improved research and development.
Investing in Research and Development (R&D)
Or investing in researching, designing, developing, and testing of new technologies. The U.S. spent 130 billion on innovations in the military sector, while the EU and member states spent only 14.4 billion, almost ten times less. The absence of any European tech companies from the top 15 global tech companies is not surprising. While historically, many innovations emerged from the defence sector, lately, this logic has been reversed. Originally, innovations developed for commercial use were used in the military. In Ukraine, for example, Microsoft safeguarded the digital infrastructure. Starlink provided internet connectivity to armed units. Commercial drones blueprinted the drones currently being used to defend Ukraine. Operation Spider Web, where Ukrainian Forces destroyed at least 41 aircrafts, including A-50 early warning and control aircraft and Tu-95 strategic bombers located thousands of kilometers away, is a great example. Spider Web highlighted the innovation and shift in asymmetric warfare, innovative use of dual-use technologies, and blurred the line between military and civilian technologies.
This tremendous lagging behind shifted Europe to an innovation background, where most of the military technology must be imported. Furtherly, such innovations in the defence industry can be later used in civil use, such as historically having been radars, computer chips, or GPS, which can later bring profit back to the budget. Inefficiency and decline in military competitiveness are also growing due to fragmentation. Member states prefer their own priorities in spending rather than jointly fostering innovations.
On March 4th 2025, the European Commission proposed an €800 billion plan – ReArm Europe, also known as Readiness2030 – the first ever formally proposed and launched defence plan by the Commission – which would essentially bring money to the defence budget (to widen the picture, in 2024, member states spent €326 billions on defence). Unlike PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation), the EDF (European Defence Fund) and EU Battlegroups, which were intergovernmentally agreed upon and based on voluntary national decisions and contributions, the ReArm is a Commission-led plan to create unified EU-wide fiscal levers. The plan was fully supported by the member states, and met sufficient support in the Parliament on March 12th, with opposition mainly from Identity & Democracy, whose MEPs are generally against deeper defence integration. Some MEPs from The Left and Greens opposed or abstained due to concerns over militarisation and bypassing democratic scrutiny. Although the Commission highlights the need to improve military equipment, apart from that, Europe must support the defence industry to decrease the import of equipment, boost military production, finance arms manufacturers, boost R&D while minimalizing the impact on national budgets (this can be done via European Investment Bank, or structures similar to NextGenerationEU).
The ReArm Europe proposal is an important first step, but without systematic strategic decisions and only by bringing money to the defence budget, it may face a lack of efficiency in the long run. To bring Europe back to the map of military competitiveness, to unlock the potential of the defence industry, many more systemic changes must be made on both the demand and the supply side. On the demand side, improving coordination in procurement gains economies of scale, which boosts R&D. On the supply side, utilizing industries that produce dual-use goods, for example, can enhance efficiency and resilience. All of these steps provide a ground upon which the European Army can be built. Without it, the European Army will remain just an idea.
Post Scriptum: The ReArm plan is changing continuously, and the White Paper initiative also includes provisions which “identifies several strategic lines of action to support the European Defence industry”[2].
[1] Military Times, (12 Feb 2024). Biden blasts Trump’s remarks on NATO as uninformed and unsafe. https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2024/02/12/biden-blasts-trumps-remarks-on-nato-as-uninformed-and-unsafe/
[2]European Commission, (12 March 2025). Introducing the White Paper for European Defence and the ReArm Europe Plan - Readiness 2030. https://defence-industry-space.ec.europa.eu/eu-defence-industry/introducing-white-paper-european-defence-and-rearm-europe-plan-readiness-2030_en?utm_source=chatgpt.com#european-readiness-2030
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