The NB8-Group: An important player in the Baltic Sea region - now more than ever

By Robert Hofmann

It was a powerful statement that was released after the meeting: “Putin does not want peace. We have clearly seen that in the past weeks. And we have seen it many times before. Ukraine is ready to negotiate. It is ready to enter into an unconditional and full ceasefire. We will step up military support to Ukraine. We underline the urgent need to accelerate the delivery of weapons, ammunition, and air defence systems.” Phrases that might sound familiar at this point, having been uttered by multiple European leaders. However, this statement was not released after any kind of EU-/ NATO or even by the Ukraine-support group. It were the presidents and prime ministers of the Nordic and Baltic countries that stood behind it. 

They had gathered for a meeting of a rather unknown and informal cooperation format, the Nordic-Baltic-Eight (NB8). Founded in 1991 and dwelling under the surface of attention for many years, the Russia-Ukraine war has somewhat revitalised the group, being faced with the immediate threat in the Baltic Sea region.  

Founded to foster independent development

Having had strong historical and geographical ties as countries around the Baltic Sea, looking back at a common history of hanseatic trade, very soon after the independence of the Baltic states Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in 1991, the Nordic Council officially signed an agreement with their Baltic counterpart 1992. Even before that, the Nordic Council had been in contact with politicians, preparing the now officialised cooperation. The nordic countries then strongly supported the Baltic states integration into EU and NATO as well as they were the first countries to allow Baltic citizens to travel to them without a visum. It was not before August 2000 that the cooperation got todays name, prior to the meeting of the ministers of Foreign Affairs, the meetings on different levels were simply referred to as 5+3.The most visible formats of the group are annual meetings of the prime ministers as the above mentioned in Kopenhagen as well as meetings of the foreign ministers such as the ministers of other resorts. Beyond that, contacts on lower levels take place on a very frequent basis, concerning not only foreign policy, but also military, educational and financial topics. Outstanding on this behalf that both the Baltic as well as the Nordic countries are themselves already among the most integrated regional groups in Europe and have opened up to coordinate each other.

Annually rotating, one country takes over a coordinating role, administrating the different meetings, setting the agenda by pushing different topics and writing reports. While Sweden had that role – comparable to the biannual role as Chair of the Council of the European Council – last year, Denmark is in charge 2025 with an (expected) focus on regional security and support for Ukraine.

What role has the NB8 previously played in regards to European security and what role can it play currently and in the future?

Previous activities in security crises

The Danish focus is not the latest, but yet one more clear sign that the purpose of the group has shifted dramatically in the past years. In the early stages the Nordic countries´ focus lay on supporting the Baltic states in their early phase of independence on their way to membership in both, the European Union and NATO. Even in 2014, the Nordic Council outlined the main objectives of the NB8 highlighting areas as education, business, innovation, environment, challenges to welfare societies and the promotion of democratic and liberal values. Security threats? Played a minor role, also because of the diverging estimation of the potential threat Russia was posing. While the Baltic states were alarmed since Russia´s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Nordic countries in a long time stressed the need and benefits of cooperation with Russia and prioritized security issues lower. Though, the group took a very clear stance on the actions, condemned the annexation of parts of Ukraine and hold the referendum in Crimea to have been illegal.

The group´s role in the Russia-Ukraine war

Russia´s invasion in Ukraine in early 2022, shifted not only policy priorities in most European countries, but especially in the Nordic and Baltic states, unified assessments of the security situation, abandoning prior ambiguities, leading to Finland and Sweden giving up their neutrality policy and deciding to join NATO. The geographical immediateness of the threat Russia is posing on these countries combined with a strong and relatively fresh memory of occupation and oppression by the Soviet Union have made the group the most determined supporter of Ukraine. Especially the Baltic states express to know Russia´s true and unchanged nature. Decades of Soviet dictatorship limiting citizen´s freedom, deportations and arrests have left their marks.  All countries have signed bilateral security agreements with Ukraine. While the USA´s positioning seems to become more and more erratic based on President Trumps actions – even threatening the territorial integrity of the member states Denmark. France is facing a crisis of political instability and support for Ukraine is diminishing other western societies, the commitment of the NB8 has not weakened. It may even lead a future coalition of the willing as support for Ukraine diminishes as threat perceptions among European countries vary.

Apart from the military support which is among the highest per capita, the countries also regularly advocate for sanctions that “strike deeper into Russia’s war economy, target the networks that sustain it, and make clear that aggression comes at an ever-higher cost.” In these positions, the group finds a strong ally in Poland, sharing geographical proximity as well as Germany. The group is further engaged in the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) with the Netherlands, deploying 10 000 troops in the region and exercising manoeuvres regularly.

This meant a huge shift in the group’s prominence and visibility within and outside of NATO, as unified voice of North-Eastern European countries on the alliance´s eastern flank. Aligning with their population´s opinions, the countries also constantly highlight the importance of security guarantees for Ukraine and a clear perspective for joining both, EU and NATO. Another aspect the NB8 is setting on the European agenda with verve, is the hybrid and cyber threat, especially stemming from Russia, lancing initiatives and coordinating strategies.

The perspective

While further evidence is needed, one might propose that their cooperation could evolve into a broader example of sustainable development, e-governance, and regional collaboration with global relevance. Furthermore, as the North Atlantic and Arctic shifts into the focus of the world public with melting ice creating new possibilities for trade routes for instance, the NB8-group or at least the Nordic Countries can be expected to play an even more important geopolitical role, even outside of Europe. Despite such ambitions not yet having been uttered publicly, the foreign minister´s visit to India in February 2024 which was the group´s first outside of Europe may be seen as an exclamation mark in the group opening up for exchange with countries around the world. 

On the other hand, the rise of importance of the NB8 can to a certain part, be explained and sufficiently be connected to the urgency of the security threat Russia is posing at the moment as well as the groups strong and unanimous position on it. As Decisions in this informal cooperation group have to be made unanimous, it can be questioned to what extent it can retain its important role once other topics will dominate the agenda in the light of growing domestic challenges for these countries, rising populist parties and somewhat diverging priorities. Being informal, the group does not possess large administrative capacities potentially needed to meet issues of high complexity, urgency and controversy among the members as well as grown expectations for the group. Whether the NB8 can sustain a cohesive and determined voice, especially in security dialogue might well decide its future importance.

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Robert Hofmann is pursuing a Bachelor's degree in political science and economics at Stockholm university. He has a particular interest in foreign security and economic policy In addition to being a member at UF Stockholm he is also a legal officer at "Youth Security Sweden"

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