European Autonomy under German Lead?
By Robert Hofmann
Already since Russia’s full-scale invasion in Ukraine in February 2022 voices had been raised that demanded a more sovereign Europe that is able to withstand Russian potential future attacks. Germany’s then chancellor Olaf Scholz proclaimed the zeitenwende (watershed) and issued a 100 billion euros debt package to arm the country’s military. Four years later the situation has gained even more urgency. The war in Ukraine is still ongoing, NATO airspace and territory - countless drone and other hybrid attacks – have been repeatedly violated and Donald Trump is back in office fighting a war in Iran and abandoning the transatlantic partnership. This poses significant challenges to European defence in the building. What are the prospects of a European military autonomy within the near future? And can Germany under chancellor Merz with its high ambitions to become Europe’s strongest conventional army lead it on the way?
The situation
European defence or even autonomy seemed for a long time to be a highly idealistic project advocated only every now and then by few voices. In fact, European integration and growth and prosperity especially in Central European states during large parts of the Post-World-War-II-era was made possible by the “Pax Americana” – the outsourcing of military security to the United States. Only in the 21st century a higher contribution of European countries entered discussion with the new Eastern European member states joining in 2004 which manifested in the binding 2% goal in 2014. The fact that eleven years later, by 2025, all 31 NATO-countries (with an own army excluding Iceland) had finally reached this goal paving the way for the updated 5%-goal, may be seen as an account for missing political will or urgency. This urgency has certainly grown with Donald Trump’s election in 2016 accommodated by demands for higher European contributions. Nonetheless, these were nothing completely new and had been previously raised by Barack Obama. Responding to these, the European Union (EU) included strategic autonomy into its global strategy 2017 and became a key goal of the von-der-Leyen-commission calling itself a “geopolitical commission”. While French president Emmanuel Macron was one of the driving forces behind it and repeatedly advocated for strategic autonomy. His proposals remained often unechoed by France’s western neighbour Germany, both Merkel and Scholz – until Russia’s full scale invasion in Ukraine and the zeitenwende. Shortly thereafter, the European Council agreed on the Strategic Compass for security and defence which is an action plan listing explicit goals summoned under “Readiness 2030” enabling additional investments of 800 billion Euros into the member states’ military. What began more than four years ago, was accelerated by Donald Trump's return to office in 2025: As the US’s new security strategy explicitly no longer names the European countries as close allies, but domestically threatened by cultural wars and immigration, European military independence gained salience. Support for European far-right parties from among others JD Vance even led to the perception of the US as an autocratizing power at least interfering in, if not threatening European democracy. What on an EU-level not only led to an economic de-risking and contained new trade partnerships, as with the Mercosur-states, India and Australia in order to reduce dependencies, is on a military level still widely decentralized. Apart from coordination the EU most significantly enables member states to finance their own military by loosening fiscal rules and providing loans. Overall, defence expenditure in Europe rose with 62.8% between 2020 and 2025. Particularly Germany’s actions are now observed closely, given the Commission’s primarily administrative role.
Germany’s commitment
The federal republic of Germany is continuing its 180-degree-turn initialized by Olaf Scholz in his famous speech in the German parliament just a few days after Russia’s invasion. The 100 billion euros “sondervermögen” (an extra-budgetarian debt) just for military spending is still used to buy new military armour. Apart from that, the government has decided that further military spending shall be excepted from the budgetary rules – saying that it is not possible to spend more money than earned by taxes. This means in principle that the government can spend as much money on the military as it wants -or deems appropriate. Already in 2025, according to SIPRI, Germany had the fourth highest military spending in the world with almost €114 billion, surpassing its European allies UK (€89 billion), France (€68 billion) and Italy (€48 billion) by far. It has also thereby also doubled since 2022. The spending is even expected to rise up to more than €150 billion in 2029 – by which Germany would reach the new NATO goal. Decided on in The Hague in summer 2025 it foresees the goal of spending annually 3.5% of the member state’s GDP for defence – for 2035. The fact that Germany is on the way to already reaching that goal six years earlier shows the country’s strong commitment. Chancellor Merz repeatedly defended his government’s policy by saying “We need to be ready to defend ourselves so that we don’t have to defend ourselves”.
However, it has to be considered that the country’s military spending now rises from a very low level or as critics put it, Germany had for a long time neglected its army and profited from the “peace dividend” – military protection by the US and being able to allocate its money on other projects. In fact, significant problems remain: A rather trivial one is whether the army can live up to NATO’s capability targets and reach the number of 460 000 soldiers (including reservists) within the next years. Since the beginning of 2026 every young man has to fill out a form about his capacities and willingness to join the army. Even though 2025 has been the year with most volunteers joining since 2011 (the last year with an obligatory military service), it is doubted whether Germany can reach its ambitious goals on a voluntary basis. Another issue concerns the slow processes in reviewing applications and procuring arms and machines. Bureaucracy and complicated structures remain a hindrance.
An unclear prospect
Given the ambitious plan that will take time to play out, international and domestic risks can be seen to threaten Europe’s security project. The war in Ukraine seems in its fifth year to be characterized by only marginal gains on both sides and heavy drone attacks. Vladimir Putin’s recent proposal to send German ex-chancellor and his good friend Gerhard Schröder as a mediator has been cautiously interpreted as a small step towards peace negotiations. However, as Ukraine stills takes up significant financial and military support, it remains in the light of rising hybrid threats on NATO’s eastern flanks a volatile situation with the potential to escalate quickly. Predictions circulating that Russia will be ready to attack on the Eastern front by 2029 only underline the urgency of the undertaken measures.
Donald Trump’s seemingly erratic foreign policy poses another major source of uncertainty for the European states. Not only does the crisis around the strait of Hormuz lead to disturbances in supply chains around the world and fuel scarcity enlarges inflationary tendencies. On a military level, concerned voices raise the scenario of Iran being in a tight corner forcing it to further escalation – or its allies Russia and China. Its own attacks on US bases and energy infrastructure around the Persian Gulf – Saudi-Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait – fuel the fear of a worldwide escalation. Even if the troubles can be resolved within the near future, further uncoordinated acting by the American president cannot be precluded.
Another conflictual region that at the moment seems to run under the global radar of attention is East Asia. China, discreetly supporting its allies Russia and Iran further in the west, has intensified its aggressions towards Taiwan regularly violating the island’s territorial integrity. The “reunification” is an explicit goal of president Xi Jinping and is said to happen within the near future. There remains a high degree of uncertainty whether the US – Taiwan’s biggest supporter so far – would actively resist China's surge. Donald Trump recently stopped a weapon deal already agreed on by congress and refuses to utter a clear position. A Chinese invasion would at the same time have the potential to split Europe. The EU has issued its position in rejecting a military changing of the status quo. How a reaction could play out, remains unsure. Even indirect military support, however, would slow down any European ambition to become defence ready. In any case, as Taiwan is one of the key suppliers of chips a Chinese invasion would lead to massive economic turbulence.
Domestic challenges
While the course on a NATO and German level seems on the surface to have been set, it shall not be ignored that Friedrich Merz’s government faces considerable domestic pressure: The coalition consisting of Merz’s Christian Democrats and the Social-Democratic Party is perceived to be hindered from solving the current economic crisis and necessary reforms by party-based bargaining. Polls and recent election results show record-high numbers of dissatisfaction and high popularity of the populist-radical-right Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). The currently biggest opposition party is known to take a more Russian-friendly stance and is against military support for Ukraine. Thus, not opposing the current military spending entirely, its rising popularity threatens the stability of the parliamentary system as none of the other main parties wants to collaborate with it. The presidential election in France 2027 could lead to far-left candidate Jean-Luc Melenchon winning who takes a very critical stance on rising military spending and NATO. British politics is once again in a phase of turbulence after Prime Minister Keir Starmer stepped down and far-right Nigel Farage leading polls by far stating the NATO expansion to the East provoked Russia.
A race against time
Even though already the Obama-administration pushed for a higher European contribution on its own defence, it has de facto for a long time been neglected. It took two elections of Donald Trump as US-president and a full-scale war in Europe to finally create the political momentum. In the eye of growing hostility from the former guarantor of security, not only the European commission, but also the member states push for a higher degree of European autonomy. Ambitious plans have been agreed on, not least the 3.5%-NATO goal. Especially Germany strikes out, having already more than doubled its defence budget just within a few years. The government is committed to consequently modernizing and enlarging its army to take the military role in Europe that it should possess given its economic strength. This prosperous outlook however, is mitigated not only by frightening predictions about Russia’s potential state of being able to attack a European country in a few years, but the extremely complex and volatile geopolitical situation with numerous potential centres of conflict. Not least within multiple countries, as governments face more and more pressure, a continuation of the current policy leading to at least a satisfactory degree of autonomy is far from being put in stone.
Robert Hofmann is pursuing a Bachelor's degree in political science and economics at Stockholm university. He has a particular interest in foreign security and economic policy In addition to being a member at UF Stockholm he is also a legal officer at "Youth Security Sweden"
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