Beneath the Invasion: A Theoretical Strategic Analysis of the Iraq War
- Ruslan Tsmokalo
- Dec 1, 2024
- 6 min read
Updated: May 17
by Ruslan Tsmokalo
“We come to Iraq with respect for its citizens, for their great civilization and for the religious faiths they practice,” declared U.S. President George W. Bush when addressing the nation on March 19, 2003. “We have no ambition in Iraq, except to remove a threat and restore control of that country to its own people.” With these words, the invasion of Iraq by the United States was framed as a mission of liberation rather than conquest, an invasion that marked a turning point in modern geopolitics, leading to significant and far-reaching consequences that continue to shape the global landscape. While the primary rationale provided for the operation was the presence of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and the need to disarm Hussein’s Iraq, subsequent evidence that came to light, as the dust settled, demonstrated that these justifications were unsubstantiated. The underlying motivations have been the subject of much debate, revealing a complex web of strategic, economic, and ideological factors that fueled the war.
A Journey into the Past
A brief excursion into history shows us that Iraq’s substantial petroleum resources and strategic location in the Middle East have long been a focal point of global interest. The discovery of oil in Iraq dates back to 1908 and translated into the formation of the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPC) in 1911, whose shares were initially owned by a consortium of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Deutsche Bank, and Royal Dutch Shell. Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, of which Iraq was a part, at the end of World War I, the British mandate over the state was established through the San Remo Conference of 1920, where access to the “blood” of the economy became a point of contention among the major powers. The establishment of the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), the successor to the TPC, in 1929 solidified Iraq’s status as a crucial energy producer, and the discovery of reserves in Kirkuk accelerated its development as a significant player in global oil markets.
Throughout the 20th century, Iraq’s oil supplies remained at once a beacon of economic potential and a fulcrum of geopolitical struggle. The new revolutionary government under the rule of Abdul-Karim Qasim, an Iraqi military officer who seized power in 1958 through a coup, was initially hesitant about nationalizing the IPC, which accounted for the state’s largest industrial sector, for fear of a similar backlash that their neighbor Iran experienced when they did the same with their Iranian Petroleum Industry. As calls for greater control over oil production intensified in the 1960s, nationalization took place under the guise of “defending” the nation’s rights. The newly formed Iraq National Oil Company (INOC) thus emerged. Iraq was absorbed into the Cold War after it aligned itself with the Soviet Union, from where it received technical and financial support for the development of its energy sector while fending off the Western companies’ influence. However, production suffered setbacks during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) and the 1991 Gulf War, leading to significant damage to the oil infrastructure. The imposition of international sanctions following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait further restricted the country’s ability to export oil. By the time of the invasion in 2003, Iraq’s oil industry was struggling, with output reduced to an average of 1.5 million barrels per day (b/d), a drastic decline from 3.5 million b/d before the 1990s.
Summary of the War and Its Results
The path of a preemptive war that the U.S. set itself on in March 2003 was justified by claims that Iraq possessed WMDs and that the Hussein regime had ties to terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda. The U.S. administration under President George W. Bush not only asserted the need to neutralize potential threats before they could develop, but also presented it as a humanitarian intervention aimed at ending the brutal dictatorship of Saddam Hussein, who had a long record of human rights violations.
Led by the U.S. with support from the United Kingdom and a coalition of other countries, the military operation began on March 20, 2003, with a massive aerial bombardment campaign followed by a ground invasion. In a matter of weeks, the U.S.-led forces toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime and, by May 1, President Bush announced the conclusion of major combat operations. However, the swift military victory was followed by a prolonged and chaotic occupation, manifested through widespread insurgency and sectarian violence against the American troops. The dissolution of the Iraqi military, combined with de-Ba’athification policies, which purged members of Saddam’s long-dominating Ba’ath Party from political positions, created a power vacuum that further intensified the country’s instability. As the essential state institutions collapsed, tens of thousands of Iraqis were left without livelihoods.
By 2004, the Bush administration acknowledged that its prewar assertions regarding Iraq’s alleged possession of WMDs had been misguided. A presidential commission confirmed the breakdown of these initial justifications, concluding that “not one bit” of intelligence concerning Iraqi WMDs had proven valid. This revelation discredited the main rationale for the conflict and cast a shadow over the intervention in Iraq, costing the U.S. the loss of public support. Amidst the military turmoil, December 2006 brought the final reckoning for Saddam Hussein, who was ultimately executed. The economic and human costs of the war were staggering: $800 billion in the U.S. Department of the Treasury spending, nearly 4,500 American and over 100,000 Iraqi deaths.
The Two Theories
A critical assessment through a blend of realism and constructivism, two of the prominent theories within international relations, can provide nuanced understanding of the motivations of the Iraq War.
Realism fundamentally emphasizes the pursuit of national interest and power in an anarchic international system where states operate under the principle of “each on their own”. The Iraq War easily fits into this framework: the U.S. aimed to secure its interests in the Middle East, a region critical to global energy security due to its substantial oil reserves. By controlling Iraq, Washington could exert influence over a major oil producer, potentially stabilizing oil markets in its favor and countering the influence of other regional powers like Iran and Russia. As seen historically, whenever foreign countries were involved with Iraq, its vast reserves—estimated to be among the largest in the world—remained of key strategic priority. While oil was not the sole motivation for the U.S. invasion, it remained a potential factor in the geopolitical calculus as it was for the previously mentioned states. Due to the U.S. being Iraq’s largest customer of oil, dissatisfaction arose from Hussein’s unfavorable manipulation of its exports, which undermined American interests. Furthermore, the installation of a pro-American regime in Baghdad also makes sense from a realist perspective, as it should serve to project power across the region as well as acquire a key strategic partner, not least in oil trade.
However, realism does not fully capture the invasion’s motivations, as Saddam Hussein’s regime did not pose an immediate threat. Constructivism, which highlights the role of ideas and meanings in shaping state behavior, offers valuable context. Securitization theory specifically deals with the notion of ‘threat’. The theory explains that issues become existential threats not inherently, but when influential actors frame them as urgent dangers through language, prompting extraordinary responses. In this case, President Bush constructed a narrative of threat regarding Iraq, as exemplified in the address to the nation, as well as in his 2002 State of the Union Address, where Iraq was labeled as a part of the ‘Axis of Evil’. The “story” of Iraqi WMDs was also central in gaining the general public’s ‘acceptance’ of this narrative—another important step without which securitization would be unattainable. The post-9/11 American society reacted sharply and widespread support was assured. By securitizing the matter, the subsequent intervention was legitimized, allowing the U.S. to put on its mantle of the international policeman without any major hindrances.
Conclusion
The fancy words used by academics, although often clunky and uninspiring, offer possibilities for deeper insight into political affairs and, if anything, produce something resembling a moral to keep in mind. The consequences of the invasion resonate throughout the decades and will continue to do so. Let it serve as a poignant reminder of how ideational factors shape the narratives around the realist goals that drive major international decisions. The way the war was framed illustrates how political actors hold the power to “securitize” an issue by constructing a story that justifies drastic action, even in the absence of clear, objective evidence. When reading about a military operation, one has to remember to exercise one’s own judgment instead of taking official narratives at face value, particularly in an era marked by rising geopolitical tensions.
While it is impossible to completely detach one’s perception, considering that we live in and are influenced by a socio-cultural context, it is still crucial to keep questioning the offered interpretations of international political matters in order to avoid false alarms, especially for the impressionable youth, the future policymakers. The ability to think independently will help prevent you from simply following the crowd and the officially sanctioned message.
Comentarios